Abstract: Life history data from Coast Salish tribes of Washington state reveal that federal War on Poverty programs produced important results that routine analysis has failed to uncover. The Comprehensive Training and Employment Act and the Indian Community Action Project provided income that enabled family networks to serve as centers of moral and financial support for members engaged in therapeutic work and provided training opportunities for a generation of leaders who are now instrumental in attracting funding for mental health programs.
Hidden among the ruins of the federal War on Poverty of the 1960s and 1970s are important contributions to the mental health of Indian people. These contributions are largely unrecognized because they were not anticipated in the writing of the legislation that established the War on Poverty and therefore are not considered in program analysis. I argue that specific federal War on Poverty programs have created conditions encouraging the mental health of the membership of Indian communities in two main ways. The programs have provided vital income that has been distributed through family networks, thereby helping these networks to continue to function as centers of financial, practical, and moral support for members engaged in therapeutic ceremonial work. In addition, a generation of tribal leaders received training and opportunities through War on Poverty programs. Today these leaders are instrumental in attracting funding for a range of programs that help Indian people and communities dealing with the stress of biculturalism and the accompanying high death rate caused by suicide, alcoholism, accidents, substance abuse, and violence (Guilmet & Whited, 1989) .
Coast Salish Indian people live in a particularly stressful environment and experience high levels of stress, distress, and anxiety. There is a certain irony in this as Guilmet et al. (1989) point out. While the Indian Health Service (IHS) and other medical services have gained control of easily managed health conditions, mental health services for chronic, debilitating problems continue to be underfunded and are actually losing ground. This makes programs that promote Indian traditional institutions with a therapeutic role and new tribal institutions that provide mental health care services all the more important.
It is not the intent here to make the case that Indian communities have important mental health needs, or even that traditional curers and ceremonial leaders have a significant role in promoting tribal mental health. These points are documented adequately elsewhere. Guilmet et al. (1989) , Jilek (1982) , Amoss (1978) , and Slagle and Weibel-Orlando (1986) have written about the Coast Salish of Washington State, and the IHS itself has documented the seriousness of mental health issues and the role of traditional people (Report of Portland Area Office, 1986), as have the tribes themselves (for example, Crume, 1988) .
Rather, this paper focuses on the contributions of federally funded programs and the ramifications they have in Indian communities. Life history data from leaders of a Coast Salish Tribe (identified as "A") and from other small Puget Sound tribes are used in order to clarify the implications of the federal funding for the leaders and their tribes. My own fieldwork, 1986-1988, and interviews with leaders from other tribes, help place the life histories in the context of the tribal social organization and the events of that period. A brief discussion of the federal War on Poverty and the subsequent analyses of two of the constituent programs, Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) and Indian Community Action Projects (ICAP) suggests why the important contributions of these programs are overlooked.
War on Poverty Programs
The positive consequences of otherwise poorly regarded federal programs have gone unnoticed because they are not easily quantifiable (Levitan & Tagged, 1977) , because program assessments have relied on macroeconomic analyzes, and because evaluation of programs over a life cycle has been too expensive (Levin, 1977) . Furthermore, because politicians, the public, and professional researchers have generally written off the War on Poverty programs as at best of marginal benefit given the costs (Bullock, Anderson, & Brady, 1983 ) the benefits to Indian communities are unexpected. A detailed ethnographic examination is necessary to uncover the results of these federal programs; enough time has now elapsed to clearly show the results.
The picture of federal War on Poverty programs on Indian reservations is muddied for reasons in addition to the ones mentioned. In some cases, internal struggles on reservations over the hiring of personnel and use of funds, and competition and distrust between tribes have clouded the record of CETA (which lasted from 1973-1982), and the ICAP (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) However, War on Poverty funds, especially those provided by CETA and ICAP, have contributed significantly to the ability of several small tribes of western Washington State to enhance tribal sovereignty by providing training opportunities to people who eventually became the tribal leaders of the 1980s. The skills these leaders gained have helped their tribes develop the sophistication necessary to compete for grants, to operate successful health clinics, to manage natural resources, and to protect tribal interests through difficult periods of "soft" grant money in the middle and late 1980s (Robbins, 1986) . Simply put, the leaders produced by these programs take primary responsibility for the delivery of health care and other services in the 1980s and in the present. It is notable that most of these leaders are women, and indeed CETA funds provided an "opportunity structure" for Indian women that has had a significant impact on tribal social organization. It is perhaps worth speculating, as several of these leaders have done, that the ending of these programs has eliminated an important source of leaders for the future.
The CETA and ICAP programs have been selected for special examination, but this is not to suggest that other programs did not have important impact in the Indian communities. These two programs have been selected for examination in part because they are unusual in that tribes and Indian organizations developed their own programs that helped promote tribal sovereignty. Jones (1982) 
War on Poverty Programs and Assessment
Haveman (1987) wrote that the early 1960s were marked by a concern for problems of poverty and disparities between the health, income, and opportunities of Anglos and minorities. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson proposed and attempted to carry out the creation of a "Great Society," and Johnson clearly intended Indians to be part of this social initiative (Prucha, 1984) . A flood of new programs aimed at the poor were developed to supplement or replace older programs. 'These efforts were undertaken with optimism that poverty could be reduced, racial inequalities diminished, and efficient investments in human productivity made" (p. 65).
The new programs attempted to address social problems from a variety of angles so that a wide range of needy would benefit. Some programs, such as the Youth Conservation Corps, provided little structured training and simply placed workers in entry-level, low-paying jobs. (Fay, 1976) .
The effects of the various programs on Indian communities are disputed. One macroeconomic analysis (Sorkin, 1971 ) examined three aspects of manpower development: direct relocation, on the job training, and adult vocational training programs. Sorkin concluded that "...measured by benefit-cost ratios at current programs levels, all three of the employment programs for Indians are relatively efficient compared with similar programs for non-Indians; apparently on the job training is somewhat more efficient than the other two. However, because present programs may have skimmed off the most promising trainees...the analysis should not be used to establish priorities for program expansion" (p. 115). Sorkin showed that from 1963 to 1967, the unemployment rates for those entering M DTA, the predecessor to CETA, dropped from 85.2% to 20% two to three years after leaving the program.
However, Sorkin (1971) also noted that, "For the on-the-job training programs, the most fundamental criticism is that a high proportion of women are enrolled, while males and nominal heads of households remain unemployed." For Sorkin, the advantage of decreasing the enrollment of single women in vocational training would be that it would increase the benefit-cost ratio. My own work (Miller, 1989a) suggests this is not a disadvantage in that the employment of women has a community-wide benefit, including providing children and youth with stable households and positive female role models. Barsh et al. further noted that federal investments in Indian programs are unproductive because they emphasize temporary employment, bureaucracy, paperwork, and poor economic development strategies. As an example of the unproductivity of federal programs, the authors point to Indian CETA funding: "Although the Department of Labor proudly boasted about the low (0.7%) federal overhead of Indian CETA funding a few years ago, sixteen percent of Indian CETA paid for tribal administrators" (p. 14). Overall, the authors found the government programs directed at Indians to be incompetent and ineffective. Morris (1988) , taking a different view, complained about Reagan administration Indian policy, which he described as "termination by accountants," and decried what he felt was an abrogation of the federal trust responsibility. In 1982 the Reagan administration proposed the total elimination of Title II and Title VI, the public service employment portions of CETA, which would have meant the loss of an estimated 10,000 on-reservation Indian jobs (ibid.). Instead, Congress created the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 (JTPA) to replace CETA, with 25% of funds allocated on the basis of the number of unemployed Indians in the area and the remainder allocated on the basis of the number of Indians who meet the poverty criteria. In addition, the Administration for Native Americans (ANA) was established in part to promote economic and social self-sufficiency. There was an over-all net loss of funding for training programs.
Analysts of non-Indian War on Poverty programs generally take a different view of the federal programs than did Sorkin. Haveman (1977) wrote that as a result of both planned and unplanned developments, the decade of 1965-75 saw improvements in the economic status of the poor, but that this was overbalanced by negative results of the programs. The programs discouraged work efforts on the part of recipients, encouraged family break-ups, and promoted migration from low-to high-benefit areas. Haveman found that by the end of the period, poverty diminished but income inequality persisted. In sum, Haveman (1977, p. 14) wrote: "When held to generally accepted principles of efficiency and equity, the social policy legacy of the 1965-75 decade does not score well." Levin (1977) found that on the basis of both investment efficiency and poverty reduction, the Job Corps, M DTA, and JOBS made only slight impact in providing specific job skills and increasing employability.
Almost a decade later, and with the benefit of additional data, Danziger and Weinberg (1986), like Haveman, found that antipoverty programs of the Great Society came to increasingly rely on income transfer, not training, and that "disincentive effects" derive from income transfer in general. They found overall limited gains from education and employment programs.
Bassi and Ashenfelter (1977) reported that CETA programs had greater benefit to minority women, especially young ones. Further, of the four types of CETA programs, work experience was the least effective. The other three types included classroom training, on-the-job training, and public service and produced positive benefits for women, averaging $600-1,200 gains and no loss of income after the program.
The ICAP programs operated from a very different premise than CETA. ICAP centers were established at four universities to provide technical support, and tribes adopted resolutions to authorize CAP agencies to be designated as Community Action Agencies. Within three years of the establishment of the program in 1964, there were 67 ICAP programs on 170 reservations serving 300,000 people (Levitan & Hetrick, 1971 ). The innovative feature was that Indians themselves designed the programs and allocated the funds (Bullock et al., 1983) . The extended family support system is of ultimate importance to most American lndian...clients. Since informal resources such as the extended family are known to provide emotional support, material assistance, physical care, information referral, and mediation in times of emotional need, a client... who perceives him/herseff as being isolated and without "family" to depend upon and interact with may experience much more difficulty in coping with acute episodes and chronic illness (p. 70).
CETA and the Indian
Families frequently are structured around and actively depend on leadership from members with relatively large and stable incomes who can provide aid to family members. This aid frequently takes the form of balanced reciprocity. For example, small sums of money are provided to family members for important purposes such as keeping a car operating. The favor may be returned by chopping wood or carrying out other useful tasks. Also, family members make loans at strategic times that are returned when the crisis is weathered and can be repaid. In Coast Salish communities this movement of capital through gift or loan may be enough to enable family members to meet the expenses of operating fishing boats or to keep homes heated in the winter. Tribal members who are not members of family networks are often unable to meet emergency or even routine financial needs (Miller, 1989a) .
Second, CETA funds in the Indian communities have indirectly served to promote family cohesion, not family break-up, as was found to be a common result of federal assistance programs. In Coast Salish communities with an ethos of communalism (Mooney, 1976) , the exchange of goods and services is the glue that binds people together. Coast Salish communities can be viewed as collectivities of family networks, and as will be seen, leaders who trained under the provisions of CETA and other programs have been able to provide benefits to their family network through their membership on the tribal council. Expertise is necessary in order for families to compete effectively with others in the tribe, a success that binds families more closely together. Furthermore, technically able leaders trained under such programs who are members of families too small to run their own candidate are able to mitigate the potential for factionalism in the community by drawing electoral support across family lines, a topic I have treated in detail elsewhere (Miller, 1989a (Miller, , 1989b participation in ceremonial life is essential to family life among Coast Salish people and quite costly (see Amoss, 1978 , for a thorough discussion of ceremonial life among the Nooksack, a Coast Salish tribe, and Suttles, 1987 , for a discussion of the importance of ceremonial life to tribal cohesion). Sending a family member through the Seowyrt winter society initiation requires that family members cook sporadically all through the winter for hundreds of guests; money be available to thank trainers, visitors, and guests; and that the families purchase items to give away to guests. The operation of the Indian Shaker Church also creates a significant financial demand on otherwise poor people. CETA employment and subsequent spin-off employment has helped Indian people meet these demands.
Fourth, tribal councilors from tribes all over Puget Sound have commented on the subtle influence of CETA in their communities. Anne Pavel, Skokomish, said of CETA that "Women were ready to take advantage of it, to be trained, and to see it as upward mobility steps. People became more qualified because of the experience" (personal communication, see Note 3). She noted that inter-tribal cooperation was fostered because CETA administrators were required to deal with multi-tribal groups. In response, the small western Washington tribes, varying from several hundred to several thousand in membership, created joint programs to meet the program terms. Experience gained in the inter-tribal ventures was useful in later successfully competing to fund multi-tribal mental health programs, such as, for example, three programs (Miller, 1989a) . All of this second group, the technocrats, have developed their careers in the following pattern: CETA and BIA funding was obtained for training in clerical and technical work; subsequent training and experience gained in the initial employment served as preparation for higher level administrative work; and the experience gave the individual the ability to make important contributions to the community as a whole.
These women have subsequently headed virtually every important division of tribal operations, including the health clinic, tribal enterprises, social services, fisheries, planning, court, housing, and elders programs. Collectively they represent a resource that is of vital importance to the well-being of Tribe A people. None would have been able to make their contribution without the availability of outside funding.
Barbara Johnson (also a pseudonym), a member of Tribe C, got her start in tribal management through War on Poverty funding, especially ICAP. Unlike Jane Jones, she had previous work experience, but Mrs. Johnson's story shows another important dimension of the impact of the federal programs: they served to draw back to the reservation people whose talent could be developed and put to use for the benefit of the tribe. In her own words: In later years, the skills these women developed have helped tribes stay competitive for the diminished federal funds. Expertise has become all the more important to small tribes as staffs have shrunk and responsibilities grown (Robbins, 1986; Miller, 1989b) .
Salaries received during training periods under CETA and other federal programs helped maintain and foster expensive cultural practices that are essential to family cohesion, individual well-being, ceremonial life, and the work of traditional curers. Traditional practices, such as giving children Indian names and conducting potlatches, and conducting traditional funerals, and winter Smokehouse dances, while never dormant, received a major boost following a quiet period. The revival of Coast Salish culture in the 1960s has been widely noted (Amoss, 1978; Dewhirst, 1976; Miller, 1989b) .
The availability of funds on an inter-tribal basis allowed the skills to spread through a mentoring process that crossed tribal boundaries. Eventually this proved helpful in the development of important inter-tribal administrative and social service organizations.
In addition, the federal programs led to the development of technocrats who are able to skillfully mediate between the tribe and outside agencies. Again, the timing of the development of these leaders has been helpful because their ascent in the 1960s corresponds with the federal policy of recognition of tribal sovereignty. CETA funding has been useful in helping terminated tribes of southern Washington state and Oregon to establish tribal operations and to regain recognition (Stephen Beckham, personal communication, see Note 2).
ICAP funding played a role in leadership development as well, although this was intended; in fact, OEO administrators claimed that the program was attracting tribal members back to the reservation, an idea substantiated by Johnson. OEO administrators hoped that the leaders produced would play a role in tribal politics and administration, and with private corporations operating on the reservations (Levitan et al., 1971) .
At the individual level, federal funding has helped allowing individual tribal members develop skills to their own advantage and satisfaction and to that of their families.
A final note: at present, several tribes mentioned here, including Tribes A and C, are considering directly administering tribal programs without BIA intervention, under the provisions of PL 93-638. In fact, in mid-1990, one Coast Salish tribe received permission to begin direct administration of its own programs. Tribal leaders are hopeful that this will enable federal dollars to go farther and that tribal programs will serve the community more efficiently. Such a development directly depends on the generation of leaders produced in the 1960s and 1970s. 
